Is reality named?
In investor communication, evasion in earnings calls is marked by machine and split into hedging, obfuscation and deception — commercially, across tens of thousands of transcripts, because money hangs on it.
Foundations
We did not invent the components. We did put them together. Each of the three dimensions rests on an established body of research — organisational psychology, financial-market research, motivation research. What does not exist is a rubric that turns those findings on internal leadership communication. That is the gap we work in.
Clarity
Financial-market research has worked on this for two decades. Bloomfield's proposition (2002): information that is costly to extract is reflected less completely — which gives senders an incentive to move uncomfortable matters to where extraction is costly. Li (2008) measured the relationship: annual reports of firms with weaker numbers are harder to read.
The obvious counter-measure does not hold. The Fog Index, the best-known readability measure, is poorly specified for specialist text because it mistakes technical vocabulary for complexity (Loughran & McDonald 2014). Hence our distinction from readability indices — not a matter of taste: the most prominent of those measures was shown to be unfit in the very domain that has used it longest.
An economic test takes its place. Costless words are not automatically empty — they become so once the interests of sender and receiver diverge (Farrell & Rabin 1996). And a signal separates two situations only when it costs the uncertain sender more than the confident one (Spence 1973). "We are a leader in AI" costs nobody anything. A dated, checkable, revisable commitment does.
Participation
That participation raises perceived fairness and reduces uncertainty is not a stance. It is one of the most stable results in organisational research, replicated over decades.
First, the procedural effect. Since Thibaut and Walker (1975), justice research has shown that people judge a procedure fairer when they were able to state their view — even when the outcome does not change. With one condition, which for us is the decisive one: the effect reverses once it becomes apparent that the hearing was inconsequential from the start. Being heard without weight is worse than no procedure at all.
Second, the outcome dependency. Procedure counts more the worse the outcome (Brockner et al. 1994). For good news, a poor process barely registers. For redundancies, it decides.
Third, the limit of communication. In a survey during a hospital restructuring, three kinds of uncertainty were measured separately. The quality of management communication was associated only with lower strategic uncertainty; structural and job-related uncertainty were lower where employees actually participated in decisions (Bordia et al. 2004). More communication does not do what participation does. That substituting one for the other makes things worse is our reading — the study's finding is the distinction, not the damage.
Fourth, the devalued gesture. Whether leaders consider themselves open says nothing about whether employees speak up; what counts is the perceived risk of speaking (Detert & Burris 2007, Edmondson 1999). "My door is always open" is not participation. It is its announcement.
Two further arguments rest on reasoning rather than original data, but sharpen the object. One concerns resistance: the prevailing account locates it in those affected and treats it as an obstacle. That is a one-sided attribution — change agents co-produce, through their own action and inaction, what they later encounter as resistance (Ford, Ford & D'Amelio 2008). The other concerns ambiguity: it is not an oversight but serves functions, among them deniability and preserving the sender's position (Eisenberg 1984). Ambiguity shifts the burden of interpretation downwards and the sender out of accountability. Which is why we distinguish between naming what is open and leaving it open.
Validated scales exist for all of this — justice, voice, psychological safety. Every one of them surveys the recipients. A rubric that codes the message itself exists only in adjacent domains: classroom research distinguishes autonomy-supportive from controlling teacher statements and has tested that against students' experienced autonomy (Reeve & Jang 2006). It has not been carried over to leadership communication. That is why this dimension carries the most weight here, and why it is the only one for which we could not adopt an existing rubric.
Efficacy
Motivation research is inconvenient for leadership rhetoric at the decisive point. Bandura (1997) ranks verbal persuasion third of four sources of self-efficacy, well behind mastery experience and modelling. A speech on its own therefore carries confidence only so far. What it can do is enable mastery: a feasible first step, available means, a feedback loop.
What counts is structure, not emphasis. For intentions of the form "on occasion X, I do Y", the execution advantage is well evidenced (Gollwitzer & Sheeran 2006: d = 0.65 across 94 independent tests). Whether a message installs such an intention in the recipient is not shown by that — so we score only whether the statement supplies the precondition: occasion, responsibility and action named. And goal research corrects a common shorthand: what works is specific and demanding; concreteness alone reduces variance without raising the level (Locke & Latham 2002).
On fear, we owe ourselves precision. It is often claimed that threat messages without an efficacy component backfire; the field's largest meta-analysis rejects that strong version (Tannenbaum et al. 2015). What is established is the weaker claim, and it suffices: messages carrying an efficacy component show substantially larger effects across studies — roughly double, though as a comparison between studies rather than an experimentally isolated contribution. Urgency sent without a way to act is urgency wasted.
Market
One dimension each, each for a different audience. None of these instruments is built for internal leadership communication.
In investor communication, evasion in earnings calls is marked by machine and split into hedging, obfuscation and deception — commercially, across tens of thousands of transcripts, because money hangs on it.
The CDC Clear Communication Index has scored for years whether material names risks and benefits. Name only the benefits, and you get zero points. Published rubric, government-validated.
In climate reporting, published classifiers separate concrete commitments from non-committal ones — the difference between an obligation and a statement of intent has become machine-distinguishable.
What appears in none of these fields is the question of the agency of those affected. It is the hardest dimension of our model — and the only one for which we could not adopt an existing rubric.
Limits
Not one of these instruments is validated for internal leadership communication, in English or in German. The word lists come from US filings, the coding schemes from classroom research and health campaigns, the scales from employee surveys. Our rubric is an original construction on borrowed ground — and we say so, rather than borrowing validity that is not ours. What follows is not caution but an obligation: rubric published, scoring logic published, every score recomputable, objection possible.
A second limit follows from this research. It explains why we test these markers. It does not license us to predict what a speech will do. We score the message and set it against what arrived. A comparison, not a causal model.
Sources
| Source | Supports |
|---|---|
| Bloomfield, R. J. (2002). The „Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis“ and Financial Reporting. Accounting Horizons 16(3), 233–243. | Obfuscation as a rational strategy. |
| Li, F. (2008). Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45(2–3), 221–247. | Empirical link: weaker numbers ↔ harder readability. |
| Loughran, T. & McDonald, B. (2014). Measuring Readability in Financial Disclosures. Journal of Finance 69(4), 1643–1671. | Fog Index poorly specified for specialist text. |
| Loughran, T. & McDonald, B. (2011). When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Journal of Finance 66(1), 35–65. | Domain-specific word lists (Uncertainty, Weak Modal). |
| Farrell, J. & Rabin, M. (1996). Cheap Talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(3), 103–118. | Costless talk becomes uninformative once interests diverge. |
| Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355–374. | A signal's discriminating power depends on differential cost. |
| Thibaut, J. & Walker, L. (1975). Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. Erlbaum. | Process vs. outcome control; fair-process effect. |
| Folger, R. (1977). Distributive and procedural justice: Combined impact of „voice“ and improvement on experienced inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35(2), 108–119. | Frustration effect: a hearing known to be inconsequential reverses the voice effect. |
| Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory? In Gergen/Greenberg/Willis (eds.), Social Exchange, 27–55. Plenum. | Procedural rules, including representation and correctability. |
| Colquitt, J. A., Conlon, D. E., Wesson, M. J., Porter, C. O. L. H. & Ng, K. Y. (2001). Justice at the millennium: A meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research. Journal of Applied Psychology 86(3), 425–445. | Meta-analysis: organisational justice widely replicated over decades. |
| Colquitt, J. A. (2001). On the dimensionality of organizational justice. Journal of Applied Psychology 86(3), 386–400. | Validated four-factor model including voice items. |
| Brockner, J. et al. (1994). Interactive effects of procedural justice and outcome negativity. Academy of Management Journal 37(2), 397–409. | Interaction: procedure counts more the more negative the outcome. |
| Grubb, W. L. (2006). Procedural justice and layoff survivors' commitment: A quantitative review. Psychological Reports 99, 515–530. | Meta-analytic support for the layoff case. |
| Bordia, P., Hunt, E., Paulsen, N., Tourish, D. & DiFonzo, N. (2004). Uncertainty during organizational change: Is it all about control? European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 13(3), 345–365. | Distinction among three kinds of uncertainty. |
| Detert, J. R. & Burris, E. R. (2007). Leadership behavior and employee voice. Academy of Management Journal 50(4), 869–884. | Perceived risk outweighs offered openness. |
| Edmondson, A. C. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly 44(2), 350–383. | Psychological safety as a leader-produced condition. |
| Ford, J. D., Ford, L. W. & D'Amelio, A. (2008). Resistance to change: The rest of the story. Academy of Management Review 33(2), 362–377. | Resistance as a relational construct. |
| Morrison, E. W. & Milliken, F. J. (2000). Organizational silence. Academy of Management Review 25(4), 706–725. | Silence as a collective, leader-induced phenomenon. |
| Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Monographs 51(3), 227–242. | Four functions of strategic ambiguity, including deniability and status preservation. |
| Bandura, A. (1997). Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control. Freeman. | Verbal persuasion as the third of four sources of self-efficacy. |
| Gollwitzer, P. M. & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal achievement: A meta-analysis. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38, 69–119. | Execution advantage of if-then intentions (d = 0.65). |
| Locke, E. A. & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal setting. American Psychologist 57(9), 705–717. | What works is specific and difficult. |
| Tannenbaum, M. B. et al. (2015). Appealing to fear: A meta-analysis of fear appeal effectiveness and theories. Psychological Bulletin 141(6), 1178–1204. | Strong backfire claim on fear appeals rejected. |
| Witte, K. & Allen, M. (2000). A meta-analysis of fear appeals. Health Education & Behavior 27(5), 591–615. | Counter-position to Tannenbaum; meta-analysis of fear appeals. |
| Reeve, J. & Jang, H. (2006). What teachers say and do to support students' autonomy. Journal of Educational Psychology 98(1), 209–218. | Categorical coding of autonomy-supportive vs. controlling statements. |
| MITI 4.2.1 (Motivational Interviewing Treatment Integrity, CASAA/University of New Mexico). | Structural model for point scoring plus findings text. |
| Voigt, R. et al. (2017). Language from police body camera footage shows racial disparities in officer respect. PNAS 114(25), 6521–6526. | Model for the path from hand rubric to corpus. |
| Source | Why not |
|---|---|
| Coch, L. & French, J. R. P. (1948). Overcoming resistance to change. Human Relations 1(4), 512–532. | Methodologically challenged; cite historically, do not carry as evidence. |
| Sandman, P. M. (Risk = Hazard + Outrage) and CDC CERC doctrine "Don't over-reassure". | Institutionally weighty, empirically thin. |
| Abrahamson, E. "Repetitive change syndrome" (HBR 2000, MIT SMR 2004). | A sharp label without a validation study. |
| Circulating practice figures on change density ("x initiatives at once"). | Consulting reports, not research. |
Objection
The scoring grid and the point logic are on the methodology page, the sources on this one. Anyone who thinks a weight, an assignment or a citation is wrong can raise it at the concrete point — and we will correct it.